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Abstract
Recent literature has brought attention to an avoidance of race-talk among Whites that not only
attributes social inequalities to non-racial factors, but challenges the existence of racism at all,
and reinforces the power of white supremacy in a way that is hard to detect. The paradigm shift
from Jim Crow to colorblind racism simply demonstrates a practice of oppression that has been
redefined and reshaped, but the foundation of our society that has been built on white supremacy
and racial inequality has yet to change. In order to preserve this foundation, colorblind ideology
has been used to implement coded language and race-neutral explanations in policy, reinforcing
the existing racial hierarchy in a powerful, but discreet, manner. This study utilizes survey data
to analyze the relationship between colorblind attitudes and policy preference. It is hypothesized
that 1) higher levels of colorblindness will lead to less support for social policies that would
benefit racial and ethnic minorities, and 2) Whites will present higher levels of colorblind
attitudes than non-Whites. Results from an online survey indicate that Hypothesis 2 was not
supported (Whites and non-Whites show similar levels of colorblindness), while Hypothesis 1
was supported (colorblindness and policy preference are significantly correlated). The study
ultimately finds that, as levels of colorblindness increase, support for social policy that would
benefit racial and ethnic minorities decreases, suggesting that racial considerations still serve as
an influence in social policy despite how subtle they may seem.
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Introduction
In 1865, the 13th Amendment was ratified, abolishing the use of slavery, or “involuntary
servitude,” in the United States (National Archives, 2016). In 1964, Jim Crow laws and practices
of discrimination were outlawed through the Civil Rights Act, with the Fair Housing Act (1968)
following soon after. Then, in 2008, the United States elected the country’s first AfricanAmerican president, Barack Obama. Today, some would argue that it is because of these very
moments and interventions that the United States can now claim itself as a post-race nation in
which people are equal and history can be left in the past. The American Dream, values of
individualism and meritocracy, and claims of a post-race society have all served as a mask to
cover up and justify the systems and ideologies that were built to create gaps in income, wealth,
poverty, homeownership, incarceration, and educational achievement (Shelby, 2016). This post-
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race narrative not only justifies and dismisses racial disparities, but it promotes the assumption
that those who face disadvantages do so due to an individual lack of effort, hard-work, or ability.
Brown v Board of Education (1954) declared separate schools to be unequal, but they
remain more segregated today than in the 1960’s (Lopez & Buriaga, 2014). The Fair Housing
Act deemed it illegal to discriminate in housing, but still, Blacks and Hispanics are more likely to
encounter unfavorable treatment half of the time (Denton, 1996). The racist structures and
systems that many in the United States view as remnants of the past are still being maintained
and reformed today. The blatant and overt racism expressed in times of slavery or Jim Crow may
not seem to be as prevalent now, but that does not dismiss the possibility for the root ideology to
reform and present itself through new methods. New norms today have encouraged certain
people, specifically Whites (Alexander, 2017), to avoid talking about or bringing up race. This
transition from a blatant racism to an avoidance of race-talk has been labeled by scholars as
colorblind racism (Bonilla-Silva, 2015), or symbolic racism (Tesler, 2012).
Colorblind racism has typically been used by Whites to avoid the uncomfortable
conversations surrounding race, specifically the conversations that address unequal opportunity
between Whites and people of color. Dismissing race as an important factor in social
inequalities, like employment, education, and incarceration, allows Whites to conceal their
privilege behind a “guise of assumed meritocracy” (Norris & Billings, 2016). In an effort to
distance the historical legacies of racism from contemporary racial inequalities, politics have
increasingly been used as an outlet to frame ideals of white supremacy into seemingly raceneutral policies. Although colorblind racism presents itself in a subtle and often hard-to-detect
form, the consequences of it remain harsh for the racial and ethnic minorities in this country,
serving as a tool to maintain economic, political, and social power for Whites. Understanding the
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“new stylistic tools” (Bonilla-Silva, 2002) that people use to avoid claims of racism will expose
the continuing significance of race in our institutions today, despite efforts to claim a post-race
narrative as legitimate.
In an attempt to consider one of the many mechanisms of colorblind racism, the current
study investigates the reinforcement of white supremacy through the use of colorblind racism in
social policy. More specifically, by analyzing the ways in which race-coding and colorblind
language are used in connection to social policies that have racialized consequences, the effect of
colorblind attitudes on policy preference is examined.

Literature Review
Colorblind racism, in this context, refers to the adoption of a post-race ideology, in which
social inequalities are labeled as issues of individualism and meritocracy in order to minimize the
role that race continues to play in determining social outcomes. What may have been initiated as
an attempt at progressiveness, the ideology of colorblindness has now become corrupted by those
benefiting from the dismissal of race, because, as Ansell (2006) suggests, “to be blind to color,
given our history and our social structure, may well mean that one must be blind to justice as
well” (p. 337). Although the mechanisms of discrimination have changed, the ideology and
feelings rooted in racism have placed themselves under the guise of colorblindness, making it
hard to detect, yet successful in maintaining harsh consequences for racial and ethnic minorities.

Consequences of Colorblind Racism
Research beginning in the 1980’s tends to show the early stages of a shift from overt to
covert racism, with scholars noting the emergence of newly formed racist strategies that
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presented as “more sanitized and coded” (Ansell, 2006). Ansell (2006) notes that what once
started as a non-racial ideology in an effort to challenge white supremacy has, in recent decades,
been taken and appropriated by Whites, and the right wing of the political spectrum, to use
claims of being “beyond race” in an attempt to deny the existence of white privilege. Through
the use of colorblindness, beliefs or actions in adherence to white supremacy are hidden,
identifying those biases becomes difficult, and the experiences of racial/ethnic minorities facing
discrimination based on race may be dismissed. Meanwhile, when a violation of race-neutrality
exists (i.e. affirmative action), Whites may use this to claim acts of “reverse racism.” Scholars
suggest that the use of race-neutral discourse serves to reinforce the racial hierarchies; it allows
Whites to see themselves as non-racist, and it “diminishes sensitivity to racism” (Plaut et al,
2018, p. 204).
In an analysis of non-response in social surveys, Alexander (2017) addresses the use of
race-neutrality, finding that dominant groups, in this case Whites, tend to be the most likely
groups to opt out of talking about racial issues. With Whites being twice as likely to claim
colorblindness than people of color, they are also more likely than non-Whites to deny the
existence of institutional discrimination and “adopt explanations for racial inequality that deny
the role of discrimination” (Alexander, 2017, p. 420). In a sample of 657 interviews, Alexander
(2017) concludes her research finding that Whites show nonresponse to race-related items at a
rate that is more than 5 times higher than non-Whites. Similarly, in an effort to understand raceneutrality and colorblindness, Bonilla-Silva (2002), analyzed a ‘Social Attitudes’ study that was
conducted among 600 college students. Bonilla-Silva (2002) found that the dominant strategy
used to maintain a race-neutral dialogue was to use the “anything but race” explanation, with
over half of the respondents relying on justifications of individualism, cultural differences, and
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merit throughout their interviews. Further, he found that younger, educated, and middle-class
people were more likely than older, less educated, and working-class people to make full use of
the resources of colorblind racism (Bonilla-Silva, 2002).
Scholars have continuously found an avoidance of race-talk among Whites that not only
attributes inequality to non-racial factors, but challenges the existence of racism at all and
reinforces the power of white supremacy in a way that is hard to detect. While racial discourse
today is more subtle, it still remains “as effective as Jim Crow in maintaining the status quo”
(Douglas, Sáenz, & Murga, 2015, p. 1430). The paradigm shift from Jim Crow to colorblindness
simply demonstrates a practice of oppression that has been redefined and reshaped, but the
foundation of white supremacy and racial inequality has yet to change. The consequences of this
are punitive for racial and ethnic minorities, as these inequalities have embedded themselves in a
variety of institutions and systems such as criminal justice, education, immigration, and public
policy.

Mechanisms of Colorblind Racism
Often referred to as “the new racism,” “symbolic racism,” or “covert racism,” the
ideology of colorblindness has been increasingly investigated by scholars in a variety of fields of
sociology, as racial inequality embeds itself within our institutions. For example, sometimes
being embraced as a method to create a welcoming and inclusive environment, colorblindness, as
a reality within our education system, has proven to dismiss and individualize racial inequalities
among students. In a study investigating teacher and student relationships within schools that
embrace colorblind ideology, Plaut et al. (2018) found that teachers who demonstrated more
colorblind orientations at school were less willing to adapt their teaching methods to the needs of
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minority students. While some attempted to create a racially safe space for students, their
language labeled these students as “academically inferior, unprepared, and disinterested” (pg.
202). Similarly, Kohli, Pizarro, & Nevárez (2017) found, in an examination of existing research,
that much of our education system has implemented “the new racism” as a method of
maintaining institutionalized power in a way that seems invisible, whether intentional or not. A
common pattern is found in that students of color and their families are often blamed for a lack
of academic success that could simply be fixed through behavioral solutions (e.g., parents should
read more to their children), when structural shifts would provide better support to students who
are failed by the system (e.g., limited resources and racial profiling) (Kohli, Pizarro, & Nevárez,
2017). This type of framing allows for methods of institutional discrimination, such as tracking,
surveillance, and punishment, to be dismissed and replaced with individual justifications (i.e.,
students of color are lazy, behaviorally challenged, and/or intellectually deficient), often leading
to an achievement gap, disproportionate rates of suspension, and an overrepresentation of Black
and Latinx students in special education (Kohli, Pizarro, & Nevárez, 2017).
Similar patterns of discrimination that are justified by colorblind ideology can be seen
within the criminal justice system, with an abundance of research claiming it to be the most
severe mechanism of colorblind racism. The criminal justice system has been used for centuries
to replace the explicit laws that once deprived people of color from basic rights. Today, racial
and ethnic minorities are still subjected to an unequal protection of the law, but in the name of
race-neutral crime control (Brewer & Heitzeg, 2008). In an analysis of the racialization of crime
and punishment, Brewer & Heitzeg (2008) suggest that this shift from an explicitly racist to a
colorblind set of legal mechanisms has not only continued the subordination of racial and ethnic
minorities, but has been justified due to a colorblind rhetoric that has shifted the conversation

7

from racial inequality to disproportionate rates of crime. In their evaluation of the criminal
justice system and colorblind racism, Brewer & Hetizeg (2008) argue,
The criminal justice system provides a convenient vehicle for physically maintaining the
old legally enforced color lines as African Americans are disproportionately policed,
prosecuted, convicted, disenfranchised, and imprisoned. The reliance on the criminal
system provides the color-blind racist regime the perfect set of codes to describe
racialized patterns of alleged crime and actual punishment without ever referring to race.
There is no discussion of race and racism; there is only public discourse about crime,
criminals, gangs, and drug-infested neighborhoods. (p. 633)

The use of colorblind justifications in a system that is greatly dependent on race allows for the
maintenance of white supremacist political and economic advantage, while remaining unchecked
by both law and public discourse under the guise of crime control (Brewer & Heitzeg, 2008).
The criminalization of racial and ethnic minorities continues to be a significant pattern
throughout the legal system, as well as public discourse, shaping discussions and public
perceptions of issues that, as a result, are now stereotypically associated with racial and ethnic
minorities.
In an analysis of immigration as a mechanism of colorblind racism, Douglas, Sáenz, &
Murga (2015) argue that, although the explicitly racialized language that once characterized
immigration policy in the United States has disappeared, race is still at the foundation of
immigration, with words like “immigrant,” “illegal immigrant,” and “undocumented immigrant”
serving as stand-ins for immigrants of color, and more specifically, Mexican and Latino
immigrants. Further, they argue that colorblind rhetoric and frames are used particularly to
dehumanize and criminalize immigrants of color, often associating them with taking away jobs

8

and resources and perpetuating crime. This study finds that, by framing immigration in a
colorblind manner, public perception and legal enforcement tend to favor and ignore European
immigration, while, in 2010, Mexicans accounted for 79.5% of all the “foreign nationals”
apprehended by law enforcement officials (Douglas, Sáenz, & Murga, 2015).
The changes that have been made in policy and the adoption of colorblind ideology,
although addressing the legalized subordination of racial and ethnic minorities, are solutions that
fail to address the embeddedness of white supremacy within our institutions. Scholars continue
to describe the prevalence of discrimination that people of color face within our education
system, criminal justice system, and immigration system, suggesting that only the superficial
symptoms of a long-lasting disease have been addressed (Kohlz, Pizarro, & Nevárez, 2017). The
common finding among this research has been the misleading claims of progressive policy that
has only shifted from using explicitly racialized language to a language that is coded yet still
triggers attitudes of racial resentment.

Colorblind Racism and Policy
Historically, white supremacy and white privilege have been constructed through overtly
racist policies such as the Indian Removal Act, slavery, or Jim Crow laws. These types of
policies serve the economic and political interests of Whites, while contributing to the
disenfranchisement and oppression of non-Whites (Jayakumar & Adamian, 2017). As racial
ideology has shifted over time and policies such as the Civil Rights Act have been passed,
Whites have had to adapt in their strategies of maintaining that established power. In order to
preserve white supremacy, colorblind ideology has been used to implement coded language and
race-neutral explanations to mask the discriminatory nature of policies today.
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In an analysis of Whites' attitudes towards punitive and preventive crime policies, Green,
Staerklé, & Sears (2006) use data from a Los Angeles County social survey to understand the
influence that symbolic racism has on policy preference. They find that racial intolerance, both
through antipathy and stereotyping, is greatly linked to Whites’ support for the death penalty and
“other harsh punishments” (Green, Staerklé, & Sears, 2006). As a consequence of racial
stereotyping, research shows that Blacks are more likely to be falsely identified as perpetrators of
violent crimes, Black perpetrators of crimes face harsher sentences than White perpetrators, and,
in capital cases, defendants whose victims are White face a higher risk of receiving the death
penalty than if their victims were non-White (Green, Staerklé, & Sears, 2006). Ultimately, this
suggests that symbolic racism is a key factor in predicting support for crime policy, and is
heavily influenced by both racial resentment and racial stereotypes.
Despite the use of race-neutral explanations such as individualism, political ideology, or
merit, symbolic racism and racial resentment are increasingly showing to be strongly associated
with policy preferences, and more specifically, Whites’ opposition to racially targeted policies
(Tarman & Sears, 2005). In a study of race coding and White opposition to welfare, Gilens
(1996) investigates the importance of racial attitudes when evaluating race coded policies like
welfare, ultimately finding that opposition to welfare depends more on racial resentment than on
any other factor considered in the study. Through a randomized telephone survey, non-Black
respondents were asked several questions with the intention of clarifying the following variables’
influence on their welfare views: attitudes toward Black people, attitudes toward the poor,
individualism, political party identification, and self-interest (Gilens, 1996). First, it was found
that when respondents were asked, "What percent of all the poor people in this country would
you say are black?,” there was a large overestimation, with the median guess being 50.6%
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(Gilens, 1996, p. 595). Then, based on the responses of the survey, and the overestimation of
Black people in poverty, it was found that the highest predictor for welfare policy preference was
racial attitude (i.e., viewing Blacks as lazy), with the second being attitudes toward the poor (i.e.,
viewing the poor as lazy) (Gilens, 1996). Despite the many race-neutral and colorblind claims
that policy preference is guided by values of individualism and economic self-interest, this study
found that the real determinant of welfare opposition is the belief that Black people are lazy and
take advantage of the welfare system.

Theory/Hypotheses
Race, although technically a social construct that is often redefined, continues to shape
the movements, beliefs, and structures within our society that result in real and substantial
consequences. Colorblind ideology has allowed for people to simultaneously deny the effect that
racial attitudes have on those movements, beliefs, and structures, while maintaining economic,
political, and social power for Whites. The shift from overt to covert racism represents a root
ideology that is simply adapting in order to produce an unequal distribution of power. Therefore,
this system of racial inequality must be analyzed in a way that, first, considers the ideology and
behavior of the oppressing group (Du Bois, 1920).

Whiteness
Scholars have continually suggested that Whiteness is both ideological and material,
meaning that “Whiteness” is not just defined as a skin color, but as a social process. As noted by
Nkomo & Ariss (2014), Whiteness is “the production and reproduction of dominance rather than
subordination, normativity rather than marginality, and privilege rather than disadvantage” (p. 3).
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White supremacy, typically defined as a belief that Whites should and do hold institutional
power over others, also refers to a social system that provides structural advantages and privilege
for Whites over other racial and ethnic minority groups despite laws of equality. The process of
maintaining this privilege, power, and normativity may change over time, but, based on a
possessive investment in whiteness (Lipsitz, 1995), people will adopt new strategies, such as
colorblind racism, in order to produce these results.
Like W.E.B. Du Bois’ concept of double-consciousness, DiAngelo (2011) suggests that
people of color are almost always seen as “having a race” and are often described in racial terms
(“the Black man”), while Whites are usually exempt from such processes, as their race is
understood as the neutral and normalized one, often being described as such (“the man”). In the
United States, it is rare that a White person does not belong, and, if a situation in which they are
the minority occurs, it is “usually very temporary, and an easily avoidable situation” (DiAngelo,
2011). Although the process of Whites discovering their racial identity has become more
common in recent times, it is often that they respond defensively to discussions addressing the
power struggle between Whites and non-Whites in this country (DiAngelo, 2011). This
defensiveness or resistance to accepting claims of inequality is described by DiAngelo as White
Fragility. According to Lowery, Knowles, Unzueta & Chow (2004), Whites often resort to three
coping mechanisms in an attempt to defend their identity. Two of the three, denial of their
privilege and distancing oneself from Whiteness through colorblind ideology, reinforce and
maintain their privileged status. Using policy as a mechanism of these coping strategies allows
Whites to not only preserve their privilege, but distance themselves from claims of racism by
using race-neutral justifications (i.e., political affiliation, individualism, and/or religion) for their
support of those policies.
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Overt to Covert Racism
In The New Jim Crow, Alexander (2010) argues that, despite a promise of racial equality,
the 13th Amendment is one of the first examples in which racially coded language was used in
order to continue the oppression of racial and ethnic minorities, specifically Blacks, in the United
States. Slavery was abolished with one exception: “except as a punishment for crime”
(Alexander, 2010). This exception marked the beginning of the ideological shift from overt to
covert racism, serving as a blueprint for other “race-neutral” but oppressive policies like the War
on Drugs and stop and frisk (Jayakumar & Adamian, 2017). As a result, “slave patrols and night
watches are now coded as police officers; slave plantations are now coded as prisons; and slaves
are now coded as inmates” (Jayakumar & Adamian, 2017, p. 915). Placing disproportionate
numbers of racial and ethnic minorities in the prison system with claims of a colorblind or just
process only serves to reinforce the false narratives surrounding individualism and the American
Dream and dismiss the significance of race. Politicians have increasingly used race-coded terms
like the War on Drugs or War on Crime in order to exploit systems of power without facing the
punishment for racial discrimination or exploitation, with some even admitting to the use of
these strategies. In a video clip from 13th [Film], former Nixon domestic policy chief John
Ehrlichman discusses the drug war, stating:
The Nixon Campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that had two enemies:
the antiwar left and black people. You understand what I’m saying? We knew we
couldn’t make it illegal to be against the war or black, but by getting the public to
associate blacks with heroin and then criminalizing it heavily, we could disrupt that
community… and vilify them night after night on the evening news. (Duvernay, 2016).
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Alexander (2016) suggests that this shift from overt to covert racism has been guided and
paralleled by the shift from overtly discriminatory policies (for example, slavery and Jim Crow)
to seemingly race-neutral ones that actually produce the same effects, but are able to avoid
intervention based on the coded language used. The ideological shift from Jim Crow to
colorblindness simply demonstrates a method of oppression that has been redefined and reshaped
in order to contribute to the systems that preserve white supremacy. In preserving this privilege,
new and adapting strategies were developed based on the concurrent desires to reinforce the
racial hierarchy, and to maintain an egalitarian self-image (Plaut et al., 2018).

Frames of Colorblindness
Colorblind racism has typically been used by scholars as a blanket term to explain the
avoidance of race-talk among people attempting to preserve privilege. Political sociologist
Eduardo Bonilla-Silva dedicates much of his work to expanding on the concept of colorblind
racism and, in doing so, has developed a four framed structure that specifies the several ways in
which colorblind ideology is typically used. First, Bonilla-Silva & Dietrich (2011) identify
several dimensions of colorblind ideology: “denial of white privilege, lack of awareness of the
implications of institutional racism, rejection of social policies such as affirmative action, and
denial of pervasive racial discrimination in the United States” (p. 194). In addition, Bonilla-Silva
& Dietrich (2011) have identified four main frames in which these dimensions are
conceptualized: Abstract Liberalism, Cultural Racism, Minimization of Racism, and
Naturalization.
The first frame, Abstract Liberalism, is the most commonly used, providing Whites with
the appearance of being “reasonable” and “moral” while opposing policies or interventions

14

intended to address racial inequality (Bonilla-Silva & Dietrich, 2011). Through this approach,
Whites are able to use “language of liberalism” that is seemingly race-neutral in their
justifications for avoiding race issues or participating in the systems that harm people of color
(i.e., opposing affirmative action because discrimination is already illegal).
The second frame, Cultural Racism, is characterized by the shift from overt to covert
racism. Instead of justifying racial inequality through claims of biological inferiority, it blames
racial inequality on the cultural practices of minorities (Bonilla-Silva & Dietrich, 2011). This
frame includes victim-blaming language that is intended to attribute minority standing to a lack
of hard work, and a lack, or inappropriate set, of values, (i.e., “If they worked harder then they
wouldn’t be in that situation,” or “If Jews, Irish, and Italians made it, how come Blacks have
not?”) (Bonilla-Silva & Dietrich, 2011, p. 193).
Third, Minimization of Racism is a frame that attributes racial inequality to “anything
but” discrimination and racism in order to dismiss discrimination as an issue of the past. Instead
of considering the effects of housing discrimination on racial segregation, for example, those that
use this frame will argue that residential segregation is a “voluntary” pattern, or a pattern due to
income differentials. Instead of considering the effects of discrimination in hiring, they will
blame the lack of diversity within their place of employment on a “lack of minorities applying.”
Instead of considering the effects of racial profiling in policing, they will blame disproportionate
incarceration rates on “higher levels of crime.”
Lastly, Naturalization is a method in which the segregation or separation of races is
deemed to be a natural occurrence, absent of any structural influence (Bonilla-Silva & Dietrich,
2011). Separate neighborhoods, separate schools, and the disadvantages that minorities face in
other areas are “just the way it is.” It is unlikely that a person will adhere to the use of only one
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of these frames. In fact, it is not uncommon for all of these frames to be used together in order to
maximize the use of colorblind racism. And, as Bonilla-Silva (2002) argues, the use of these
frames does not mean a person is “any less racist” than an overtly prejudiced person; it simply
means that they are better at “navigating the dangerous waters of America’s contemporary racial
landscape” (p. 62) and know how to use a race-neutral language to “save face.”
Jayakumar & Adamian (2017) confirm the use of different strategies, or frames, of
colorblindness within their study of racism among White students at Historically Black Colleges
and Universities (HBCUs), ultimately concluding that, not only did the sample exhaust all of
Bonilla-Silva’s Four Frames of Colorblindness, but they began to use a new strategy. This new
strategy, what Jayakumar & Adamian (2017) deem as the Fifth Frame of colorblind racism, is
dominantly used by Whites who express an acknowledgment of institutional racism, yet use this
knowledge to their advantage. For example, respondents would acknowledge themselves as
racist or as having privilege, but the researchers found that this was a “preemptive strike that
protects him from being called out by others as racist,” as well as a way to mitigate feelings of
guilt (Jayakumar & Adamian, 2017, pg. 925). Other respondents using this Fifth Frame would
refer to other White people as “they” in order to remove themselves from the associations of
Whiteness while preserving their own privilege (Jayakumar & Adamian, 2017). This new frame
allows for people to use their knowledge about systemic and institutional racism in order to
preserve white privilege in an extremely discrete way that not only maintains comfort, but
removes accountability.
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Hypotheses
Based on research suggesting that there has recently been a shift from blatant to
colorblind racism that is characterized by Whites benefitting from seemingly race-neutral
policies that, in fact, have a racialized effect, the following hypotheses have been developed:

Hypothesis 1: A higher degree of colorblindness will lead to less support for social policies that
would benefit racial and ethnic minorities.
Hypothesis 2: Whites will demonstrate a higher degree of colorblindness than non-Whites.

Methods
Data and Sample
Data were collected through an online survey. The survey link was posted on the
Facebook pages of a random selection of county community groups in Washington, Oregon, and
California from March 18, 2022 through April 18, 2022. Respondents self-selected to participate
in the survey.
The sample contained 152 participants (aged 18-65+). Approximately 70% were women
(n=106), 28% were men (n=43), and 2% identified as genderqueer (n=3). Approximately 72% of
the participants were White, and the remaining participants, 28%, were categorized as nonWhite. The non-White category consisted of respondents identifying as Hispanic or Latino,
Black or African American, American Indian or Alaska Native, Native Hawaiian or Pacific
Islander, and Asian or Asian American (see Table 1). Just over one percent of the sample
identified as Multiracial or Multiethnic and 2.6% identified as Other.
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The most frequently identified political affiliation within the sample was Democrat
(45%), while the least common political affiliation was Republican (17.1%). Nearly 30% of
respondents identified as Independent, and the remainder of the sample identified as Other.
Education level among participants varied, with the most frequent levels of education being High
School (26.3%) or a Bachelor’s Degree (28.3%). Other respondents indicated that they had
earned either an Associate’s Degree (17%) or a Master’s Degree (17.2%). Only a small
percentage of respondents indicated that they had received some high school (0.7%), attended
trade school (7.9%), or earned a Ph.D. or Higher (2.6%).
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Variables
The primary variables in the analyses were degree of support for social policy (or policy
preference), race/ethnicity, and degree of colorblindness. Degree of support for social policy (or
policy preference) was measured by a five-point Likert scale for a series of seven items. Each
item included a policy proposal (see Table 2), in which respondents indicated their degree of
support, ranging from ‘Strongly Support’ (=5) to Strongly Oppose’ (=1). Degree of support for
social policy refers to the level that subjects supported or opposed social policies that would
benefit racial and ethnic minorities. This variable was computed by averaging a respondent's
Likert responses for the seven policy proposal items. The policy proposal items were guided by
polls previously conducted by CNN news (2020), CBS (2015), and Monmouth University
(2019), and served as appropriate measures of social policy preference within this study based on
the use of racially coded language.
Race/ethnicity was measured based on a multiple choice response in which respondents
indicated the race or ethnicity with which they identified with. Response options included
Hispanic or Latino, Black or African American, American Indian or Alaska Native, Native
Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, Asian or Asian American, Middle Eastern or North African,
Multiracial or Mutli-ethnic, and Other. A dummy variable was computed for use in the
quantitative analyses (Whites=1, Non-Whites=0).
Degree of colorblindness was measured by a five-point Likert scale for a series of seven
items. Each item included a social attitude statement (see Table 3) in which respondents
indicated their degree of agreement, ranging from ‘Strongly Agree’ (=5) to ‘Strongly Disagree’
(=1). Degree of colorblindness refers to the level that subjects agreed or disagreed with
statements that promoted a post-race ideology. This variable was computed by averaging
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a respondent's Likert responses for the seven statement items. The statement items were guided
by CoBRAS (Neville et al. 2000). This scale is designed to measure a subject’s degree of
colorblindness based on their agreement/disagreement with a series of statements that endorse
colorblind attitude, individualism, meritocracy, and post-race ideology.
Other variables included in the analyses were gender, political party, age, income, and
education. Each demographic variable was measured based on responses to multiple choice
items. Dummy variables were created for gender and political party. Gender was coded 1 if the
respondent identified as male, and 0 if the respondent identified otherwise (female or
genderqueer/non-binary). Political party was coded as 1 if the respondent identified as
Republican, and 0 if the respondent identified as either Democrat or Independent. The remainder
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of the measures—age, income and education—were ranked categorical variables, with the value
increasing by one point as the age, income, and education of the respondent increased.

Procedures
Quantitative data analyses were used to test the hypotheses. In order to test both
hypotheses, correlation coefficients were examined. Although the primary focus was to explore a
potential correlation between degree of colorblindness and degree of support for policy, as well
as a potential correlation between race/ethnicity and degree of colorblindness, it was recognized
that separate relationships may exist between these variables and the variables of age, income,
education, gender, and political party. To further examine the degree of colorblindness and
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degree of support for policy among these variables, a series of descriptives were examined in
order to compare means of colorblindness and policy preference across demographics. These
descriptive analyses provided further examination of Hypothesis 2 as well.
Previous research has suggested a more frequent use of non-response or neutral responses
within surveys among Whites (Alexander, 2017). Based on this finding, and the avoidance of
race-talk illustrated in colorblind racism, the analysis of “Neutral” responses within the current
study were used to examine the relationship between colorblindness and race/ethnicity. A
separate set of frequencies were examined in order to explore the relationship between degree of
colorblindness and degree of support for policy.
In a study conducted by Jayakumar & Adamian (2017), a fifth frame of colorblindness is
explored. This fifth frame is characterized by Whites who express an acknowledgment of
institutional racism, yet use this knowledge to their advantage in order to preserve white
privilege or maintain comfort in racialized discourse. In order to explore this frame further, a
series of frequencies were examined within the current study. The responses to statements and
policy proposals were examined in order to analyze any cases in which respondents had a low
degree of colorblindness (disagreement with statements), and a low degree of support for social
policy (opposition to policy proposals). Respondents who disagreed with post-race ideology, yet
opposed the policies that would benefit racial and ethnic minorities may be reflecting the fifth
frame of colorblindness.

Results:
Correlation coefficients were computed among all demographic variables (race/ethnicity,
gender, political party, income, age, and education), colorblindness, and policy preference. The
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results of the correlational analyses showed that four out of seven correlations between
demographic variables and colorblindness were statistically significant, and four out of seven
correlations between those same demographic variables and policy preference were statistically
significant as well (see Table 4). These demographic variables included political party
(Republicans and Democrats), gender (Males) and education.

In order to test Hypothesis 1, a correlation coefficient was computed between levels of
colorblindness and levels of support for policy, ultimately demonstrating a strong correlation, r=.799**, at a significance level of p=.001. When testing all items measuring colorblind attitude (7
items) and policy preference (7 items) for individual correlations, it was found that all 49
correlations were strong and significant at either the p= < .01 or p= <.05, level. Numerous
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correlations between variables of age, income, education, and political party were found to be
significant, but are excluded, as they go beyond the scope of this specific study.
Hypothesis 2 remains unsupported, as the correlation between race/ethnicity and degree
of colorblindness is not significant. In general, the results suggest that a higher level of
colorblindness is correlated with less support for social policies that could benefit racial/ethnic
minorities. Males and Republicans, when compared to females and Democrats, tend to have
higher degrees of colorblindness and indicate less support for social policies that could benefit
racial/ethnic minorities.
To further explore Hypothesis 2 (that Whites present a higher degree of colorblind
attitudes than non-Whites), a series of descriptives were examined (see Table 5). When
comparing the average degree of colorblindness and the average degree of policy support
between Whites (n= 110) and Non-Whites (n =140), it was found that they countered the
expectations of Hypothesis 2, with non-Whites (M = 2.69), demonstrating a similar, but slightly
higher, degree of colorblindness as Whites (M = 2.41). Additionally, when comparing the degree
of policy support between both groups, Whites (M= 3.55) and non-Whites (M= 3.52) presented
similar policy preference.
Mean scores on degree of colorblindness and support for social policies that could benefit
racial/ethnic minorities were also examined by political party and gender. In comparing these
variables between gender categories, males demonstrated a higher degree of colorblindness (M=
2.92) than both females (M=2.3) and genderqueer/non-binary participants (M=2.86). When
examining the degree of policy support, the opposite effect was found, with males showing less
support for policy (M= 3.06) than both females (M=3.74) and genderqueer/non-binary
participants (M=3.48). Political party categories demonstrated the most variance in averages,
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with Republicans scoring the highest degree of colorblindness (M= 3.42) but the lowest degree
of support for policy (M= 2.47), Democrats scoring the lowest degree of colorblindness (M=
1.95) but the highest support for policy (M= 4.11), and Independents scoring somewhere in the
middle on both degree of colorblindness (M= 2.76) and degree of policy support (M= 3.26).
Consistent with the correlation coefficient for education, respondents with higher levels of
education (Bachelor’s, Master’s, and Ph.D. or Higher) scored a lower degree of colorblindness
(M=2.2) while respondents with lower levels of education (Some High School, High School, and
Trade School) scored a higher degree of colorblindness (M= 2.7). Although no significant
correlation exists, it was found that both lower income and higher income respondents scored a
higher degree of colorblindness (M= 2.55) than middle income respondents (M=2.29).
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The main findings found here support those found in the computed correlation
coefficients. Although Whites and non-Whites did not differ significantly in degree of
colorblindness or degree of support for policy, males, Republicans, and those with lower levels
of education tended to have higher degrees of colorblindness and lower levels of support for
social policy. Conversely, women, Democrats, and those with higher levels of education tended
to have lower degrees of colorblindness and higher degrees of support for social policy.
Finally, frequencies of “Neutral” responses were examined in order to analyze a potential
relationship between an avoidance of race-talk and race/ethnicity. A separate set of frequencies
were computed for individual items on the survey in order to identify any discrepancies found
between policy support and colorblindness in items that were similar (i.e., immigration policy
and immigration attitude, or affirmative action policy and affirmative action attitude). For the
majority of these items, the rate of “Neutral” responses between Whites and non-Whites were
very similar. However, two items presented differing rates of “Neutral” responses. For the policy
item, “Affirmative action in college admissions in order to increase diversity,” sixteen percent of
Whites responded “Neutral,” compared to 0.05% of non-Whites. Similarly, for the policy item,
“The federal government providing health insurance coverage for undocumented immigrants
living in the United States,” eleven percent of Whites responded “Neutral,” while 0.04% of nonWhites responded as so.
When identifying any discrepancies between statement agreeance and policy support, it
was found that, in some cases, Whites responded more favorably toward a statement than toward
the policy that reflected that statement. For example, in the statement item regarding welfare,
seventy-two percent of Whites disagreed that “the majority welfare recipients take advantage of
the system,” but only sixty-four percent of Whites supported the policy proposed to increase
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funding for welfare. Again, in the statement item regarding immigrant assimilation, sixty-four
percent of Whites disagreed that immigrants should “try harder to fit into the U.S culture and
society,” but only 51% of Whites supported health insurance for immigrants. Although these
items do not exactly reflect one another, this may be an important pattern to note.

Discussion
This study demonstrates, first, that the relationship between colorblind attitudes and
policy preference is strongly supported, with all 49 items testing colorblind attitude and policy
preference presenting a strong and significant correlation. This finding is consistent with
previous research, and specifically the findings of Gilens’ (1996) welfare opposition study,
suggesting that policy preference is heavily dependent on racial attitudes, despite the common
use of race-neutral explanations such as individualism, self-interest, meritocracy, or partisan
loyalty. Similarly, despite the strong correlations found between gender and political party and
degree of policy support, the main determinant of policy preference found in this study is the
degree of colorblindness, showing consistency with previous research that has found racial
attitudes to be more influential on policy preference than both gender and political affiliation
(Gilens’, 1996; Green, Staerklé, & Sears, 2006). In addition to reflecting the empirical findings
of Gilens (1996) and Green, Staerklé, & Sears (2006), the relationship between colorblind
attitudes and policy preference found in this study support Alexander (2010) and Bonilla-Silva’s
(2015) concepts of race-coding in public policy and policy preference, suggesting that colorblind
racism, though not as blatant as other forms of racism, is real in its consequences. The language
used in the policies and statements listed (“welfare,” “immigration,” and “affirmative action”)
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were not explicitly race-based, but have been shown in previous research to be associated with
race and evoke racially charged emotions.
When analyzing the correlation between the variables of education, gender, and political
party and the measures of colorblindness and policy support, it was found that males,
Republicans, and respondents with less education were more likely to have a higher degree of
colorblindness and less likely to support social policy, while gender minorities (females,
genderqueer/non-binary), Democrats, and respondents with higher levels of education were more
likely to have a lower degree of colorblindness and more likely to support social policy. These
findings are very consistent with previous research on specific demographics and policy support,
as many of the survey items represented partisan issues. With regard to colorblindness, it seems
that there is a gendered effect happening, possibly due to the fact that males tend to benefit from
the social hierarchies that are in place, therefore differing in their level of support for policies
that would benefit minorities. Although not correlated, when looking at income in connection to
colorblindness, it was found that the middle categories of income tended to have a lower degree
of colorblindness than the lower and upper categories of income. Those with both higher levels
of education and middle-class income status are described by Bonilla Silva as populations that
are more adept to the use of colorblindness (Bonilla-Silva, 2002). This may suggest that these
populations within the sample do hold colorblind attitudes, but have a better capability of hiding
it, or this may simply suggest that these populations have lower levels of colorblind attitudes.
In instances of differing rates of “Neutral” responses, it was found that Whites were more
likely than non-Whites to respond neutrally, illustrating a potential avoidance of race-talk, an
avoidance of intervention, and/or a desire to remain neutral. Although not as extreme, this
nonresponse pattern is similar to what was found by Alexander (2017). This finding suggests that
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some Whites may prefer to opt out of taking a stance on racial issues; they are aware that
opposing social policy can be interpreted as racist, but supporting it would be compromising the
racial hierarchy from which they benefit, so they may choose to avoid this conflict by remaining
neutral and avoiding the discussion of race. In a country that has built white supremacy into the
“fabrics of our society” (DiAngelo, 2011), simply doing nothing, or remaining neutral on
racialized issues, is enough to maintain ownership of that power (Du Bois, 1920).
In some cases, it was found that Whites were more likely to disagree with a colorblind
statement yet oppose social policies that would benefit racial and ethnic minorities. For example,
while 72% of White respondents disagreed that “the majority of welfare recipients take
advantage of the system”, only 62% of White respondents demonstrated support for increasing
welfare funding. Similarly, it was found that 64% of White respondents disagreed that
immigrants should “try harder to fit into U.S. culture and society,” but only 51% of Whites
supported the policy that would provide health insurance for immigrants. Although these
deviations are not extreme and the parallels between statement and policy are not exact, this
pattern in responses shows that some Whites were able to disagree with racial stereotypes, but
not all supported the policies that are intended to intervene in institutional and systemic racism.
Despite acknowledgments of racism, some Whites are continuing to oppose social policies that
are intended to disrupt racial inequality in order to preserve their privilege and power. Jayakumar
& Adamian (2017) suggest this process of awareness and appropriation as the 5th Frame of
Colorblind Racism, characterized by Whites presenting themselves as having racial awareness,
but using this knowledge to better mask their use of colorblind racism and opposition to policies
that are intended to intervene in the oppression of racial and ethnic minorities.
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Finally, regarding the lack of support for Hypothesis 2, it is crucial to note that the
majority of the non-White population within this study identified as Hispanic or Latino, and with
very few respondents from other racial and ethnic minority categories, this very well may have
influenced the correlation between race and degree of colorblindness. Colorblind racism is not
exclusively used by Whites. Research suggests that some racial and ethnic minorities,
specifically Hispanic and Latino groups, resort to the use of colorblind ideology as well (BonillaSilva, 2015). Research shows that Latinos are increasingly likely to adopt colorblind attitudes in
an attempt to distance themselves from Blacks in the racial hierarchy (Bonilla-Silva, 2015). For
example, in a poll conducted by ABC News/Washington Post (2014), when asked “How
confident are you that the police in this country are adequately trained to avoid the use of
excessive force?”, twenty-three percent of Whites and 22% of Hispanics responded with “very
confident,” while only 4% of Blacks responded this way. Similarly, in a poll conducted by Pew
Research (2013), when asked “Compared with five years ago, do you think the situation of Black
people in this country today is better?”, thirty-five percent of Whites and 37% of Hispanics
responded with “better,” while only 26% of Blacks responded similarly. Given these findings,
further research could investigate whether a more diverse sample of non-Whites would impact
the degree of colorblindness found in this study.
When conducting further research, an investigation into racial generalizations and
assumptions may be useful, as Gilens (1996) discovered when linking the overestimation of
Blacks in poverty to opposition to welfare. Considering these assumptions may be beneficial to
understanding the specific beliefs behind the use of colorblind racism. For example, are people
opposed to immigration because they believe that immigrants commit more crime, or because
they assume the majority of immigrants are Hispanic and believe Hispanics commit more crime?
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These assumptions should be considered when analyzing the use of colorblind racism in policy
preference. In addition, previous research has benefitted from the use of interviews when
analyzing the use of colorblind racism. Hearing race-neutral and colorblind language firsthand
could allow for a more in-depth analysis of the types of colorblind racism that are being used,
whereas a survey, and this study specifically, is limited to simply determining whether or not the
ideology is being used. Lastly, the inclusion of overt strategies of racism may allow for a deeper
analysis of the ideological shift that has occurred throughout living generations. Understanding
the relationship between age and racism, whether its overt or covert, would allow for a
comparison between younger generations who are more adept to colorblind language and older
generations who have had to adjust between different methods of racism.

Conclusion
The findings of this study confirm that colorblind racism is a main determinant of policy
preference, despite the common race-neutral explanations of partisan loyalty, individualism, or
merit. Now requiring that claims of racism have tangible proof, a perpetrator, or an act of hate
(Lopez, 2003), politics have become a safety valve for the overwhelming desire to maintain
white privilege in a non-explicitly racist way. Affirmative action, welfare, crime, and
immigration policies have been, and continue to be, manipulated in a way that benefits Whites,
but removes marks of racism. Although this method of racism presents itself in a subtle, and
often hard-to-detect, form, the consequences of it remain punitive for the racial and ethnic
minorities in this country. The paradigm shift from blatant racism to colorblind racism simply
demonstrates a practice of oppression that has been redefined and reshaped, but the foundation of
white supremacy and racial inequality has yet to change. As W.E.B. Du Bois’ (1920) notes,

31

although having no biological importance, race has now become a construct too embedded in our
society to one day decide that it can be ignored.
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